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Abstract
Previous studies have attributedmultiple diverse roles to the posterior superior temporal cortex (STC), both visually driven and
cognitive, including part of the default mode network (DMN). Here, we demonstrate a unifying property across this multimodal
region. Speciﬁcally, the lateral intermediate (LIM) portion of STC showed an unexpected feature: a progressively decreasing fMRI
response to increases in visual stimulus size (or number). Such responses are reversed in sign, relative towell-known responses
in classic occipital temporal visual cortex. In LIM, this “reversed” size functionwas present acrossmultiple object categories and
retinotopic eccentricities. Moreover, we found a signiﬁcant interaction between the LIM size function and the distribution of
subjects’ attention. These ﬁndings suggest that LIM serves as a part of the DMN. Further analysis of functional connectivity,
plus a meta-analysis of previous fMRI results, suggests that LIM is a heterogeneous area including different subdivisions.
Surprisingly, analogous fMRI tests in macaque monkeys did not reveal a clear homolog of LIM. This interspecies discrepancy
supports the idea that self-referential thinking and theory of mind are more prominent in humans, compared with monkeys.
Key words: DMN, fMRI, homology, size response function, temporal cortex
Introduction
In most animals, extensive neural processing is devoted to sen-
sory perception of physical variations in the externalworld. How-
ever, in humans (and perhaps other species), the “internal world”
also strongly inﬂuences sensory perception and its underlying
the neural processes. These internal representations include:
self-referential and affective decision-making (Gusnard et al.
2001; Wicker et al. 2003; D’Argembeau et al. 2005, 2010; van der
Meer et al. 2010; Qin and Northoff 2011; Denny et al. 2012; Mol-
nar-Szakacs andUddin 2013), thinking about the future (Schacter
and Addis 2007; Arzy et al. 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010;
Spreng and Grady 2010) and instances involving theory of mind
(ToM)(Gallagher and Frith 2003; Saxe et al. 2004; Ochsner et al.
2004; Spreng et al. 2009).
One strikingmanifestation of such internal representations is
the default mode network (DMN). The DMN is a set of cortical
areas that show higher fMRI activity during speciﬁc internal pro-
cessing states (Shulman et al. 1997; Mazoyer et al. 2001; Raichle
et al. 2001; Buckner et al. 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). Two
areas comprise the core (i.e., the main “hub”) of the DMN: the
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cor-
tex (PCC). These core areas are functionally connected with add-
itional subareas of the DMN including the inferior parietal lobe
(IPL), angular gyrus (ANG), temporal-parietal junction (TPJ),
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lateral temporal cortex (LTC), and the temporal pole (Greicius
et al. 2003; Buckner et al. 2008; Hagmann et al. 2008; Andrews-
Hanna et al. 2010; Mantini and Vanduffel 2013). Many studies
have focused on the role of the DMN core areas (i.e., mPFC and
PCC) in “stimulus-independent” and “task-unrelated” thinking
(McKiernan et al. 2006; Mason et al. 2007), including social cogni-
tive processing, retrieval of autobiographical memory, and self-
referential decision-making (for review, see Buckner et al. 2008;
Mantini and Vanduffel 2013; Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin 2013).
In comparison with these studies of the DMN core areas, the
role of DMN subareas remains less understood. Here, we mainly
focus on 1 of those subareas, the LTC, which is located near the
anterior-lateral border of classic visual cortex along the superior
temporal sulcus (STS). The speciﬁc location of LTC varies some-
what across different studies, including parts of the IPL, the
ANG, and the superior/middle temporal gyri (Buckner et al.
2008; Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010; Mantini and Vanduffel 2013).
Activity inLTChasalsobeen interpretedsomewhatdifferently
across studies. Some studies suggest that themore posterior por-
tion of LTC (including angular and superior temporal gyrus) is in-
volved in processing ToM (Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Young et al.
2007; Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009; Dodell-Feder et al. 2011;
Heatherton 2011; Sebastian et al. 2011). Other studies highlight
the role of LTC in autobiographic memory and internal represen-
tations of the self (Buckner et al. 2008; Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010;
Spreng and Grady 2010; Denny et al. 2012; Bado et al. 2013).
In the sensory realm, additional studies have reported that
nearby or overlapping cortical regions (including themedial tem-
poral gyrus and the STS) are activated during face processing, es-
pecially during the encoding of eye gaze direction (Puce et al.
1998; Pelphrey et al. 2005; Engell and Haxby 2007; Ethofer et al.
2011) and facial expression (Haxby et al. 2000; Winston et al.
2004; Engell and Haxby 2007; Said et al. 2011), and also the visual
interpretation of biological motion (Puce et al. 1996; Beauchamp
et al. 2003; Thompson et al. 2007; Fox et al. 2009; Jastorff and
Orban 2009; Pinsk et al. 2009; Furl et al. 2011; Julian et al. 2012;
Avidan et al. 2014). Presumably, all these processes involve inter-
pretations of actions in other people, based on comparison
with internal representations of analogous experiences in the
observer.
Based on this evidence, and because LTC is located near rela-
tively well-studied regions of visual cortex, 1 hypothesis is that
LTC is involved in the transition of information from external
(e.g., sensory) to internal representation(s). Here, we used fMRI
to study that functional transition, based on graded sensory
manipulations that we found to systematically inﬂuence these
internal representations.
More speciﬁcally, it is known that fMRI activity decreases sig-
niﬁcantly in theDMNwhen subjects direct their attention toward
more salient (i.e., more “immediate”) stimuli in the surrounding
environment, compared with passive viewing of a spatially uni-
form screen and/ormentation tasks (Shulman et al. 1997; Raichle
et al. 2001; Greicius and Menon 2004; Buckner et al. 2008).
Importantly, such decreased fMRI activity to increased visual
stimulation in the DMN is opposite in sign to that typically found
when measuring visually driven fMRI responses throughout pri-
mate visual cortex. From early retinotopic areas to high-level cat-
egory-selective areas, presentation of a wide range of visual
stimuli increases the level of fMRI activity relative to that found
during ﬁxation on a uniform gray screen (i.e., a common baseline
condition in visual system studies). Moreover, in visual cortex,
this visually driven activity increases when the (retinal) stimulus
size is made larger in the visual ﬁeld (Ito et al. 1995; Allison et al.
1999; Ashbridge et al. 2000; Op de Beeck and Vogels 2000; Konkle
andOliva 2012). Thus, 1 corollary of our current hypothesis is that
the sign of the response to increased visual stimulation will re-
verse in the cortical map, at or near the border between classic
visual cortex and the nearby DMN subarea, LTC. If so, this
would furnish a clear-cut opportunity to study where and how
the sensory and internal processing systems are functionally in-
terconnected, and how they interact with each other, at the level
of fMRI.
We addressed these questions in 7 experiments. In Experi-
ment 1,we systematically tested for a paradoxically decreased re-
sponse to increased stimulus size in the vicinity of LTC, and (as a
control) throughout the brain. These results conﬁrmed our hy-
pothesis, which enabled the subsequent experiments. We refer
to the region that showed decreased responses to larger stimuli
as the lateral intermediate (“LIM”) region. Experiment 2 com-
pared the effect of object “size” versus object “number” on the
evoked activity in LIM, to distinguish between the effects of ob-
ject size per se versus a more general increase in the surface
area of the stimulated visual ﬁeld. Experiment 3 tested whether
the distinctive LIM responses depend on stimulus eccentricity,
which is 1 axis of visual ﬁeld position. Experiment 4 began relat-
ing these sensory (externally driven) ﬁndings to the cognitive (in-
ternal) realm, by systematically varying the distribution of spatial
attention and testing its inﬂuence on activitywithin LIM. Because
previous experiments have reported additional functional prop-
erties (including biological motion- and face-selective responses)
in the vicinity of LIM, Experiment 5 tested the overlap between
LIM and these other functions, in additional experiments and
in a meta-analysis of previous data. To clarify the underlying
neural circuits, Experiment 6mapped the distinct functional con-
nectivity within LIM, relative to the rest of the brain.
The conﬂuence of internal and externally driven inﬂuences
found in this general region of human cortex (Experiments 1–6)
raised a question: Do analogous cortical regions exist in other
primates such as themacaquemonkey? This question has signiﬁ-
cant implications.Many studies have shown that the organization
of visual cortex (representing the external world) is largely con-
served across these 2 species (Van Essen et al. 2001; Tootell et al.
2003; Orban et al. 2004). However, the presumptive homolog of
DMN (representing the internal world) is much less studied in
nonhuman primates (but see Rilling et al. 2007; Vincent et al.
2007; Kojima et al. 2009; Mantini et al. 2011; Mars et al. 2013). Mul-
tiple lines of evidence suggest that this region of occipitoparietal
cortex is proportionately smaller inmacaques comparedwith hu-
mans (Orban et al. 2004; Sereno and Tootell 2005). Thus, an LIM
homologmay be either absent or signiﬁcantly smaller inmacaque
monkeys, compared with LIM in humans. Alternatively, it may be
that LIM is also prominent andextensive inmacaque, to the extent
that LIMserves acrucial functioncommontoboth species. To clar-
ify this issue, Experiment 7usedanalogous fMRI techniques to test




For each experiment, human subjects were selected randomly
from a pool of 24 subjects (13 females), aged 20–36 years. All sub-
jects had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and radio-
logically normal brains, without history of neuropsychological
disorder. All experimental procedures conformed to NIH guide-
lines and were approved by Massachusetts General Hospital pro-
tocols. Written informed consent was obtained from all subjects.
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Stimuli. Experiment 1A. This experiment included images from 3
different image categories including faces (20 images), nonface
everyday objects (40 images), and irregular shapes (20 images)
(Fig. 1A). In all experiments, imageswere adjusted for achromatic
contrast, based on root mean square. In each scan session, trials
were blocked according to the stimulus category (faces vs. non-
face everyday objects vs. irregular shapes) and size (i.e., small
[0.35 degrees2] vs. large [73.50 degrees2]). In this and the following
experiments, 16 imageswere presented in each block. Image dur-
ation was 1 s.
Experiment 1B. Thirty different images of face and nonface every-
day objects (independent of those used in Experiment 1A) were
presented randomly in each block. Stimuli were blocked accord-
ing to their retinal size (area), varying from 0° (i.e., a uniform gray
screen, used as a baseline condition) through 0.04 degrees2, 0.34
degrees2, 11.40 degrees2, and 181.66 degrees2. Other details are
similar to those in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2. This experiment used 19 different images of face
and nonface everyday objects, independent of those used in Ex-
periments 1A and 1B. In those blocks in which multiple objects
were presented, 1 object was always positioned at the center of
screen, and 9 other objects were positioned at random locations
surrounding it on the display screen, without any overlap be-
tween objects. Stimuli were images of face and nonface objects
with the following conﬁgurations: 1) a single small object (0.51
degrees2 visual ﬁeld area), 2) a single medium object (5.59 de-
grees2), 3) a single large object (55.95 degrees2) and 4) 10 me-
dium-sized objects presented concurrently (summed visual
ﬁeld area = 55.95 degrees2) (Fig. 2A). Importantly, the total visual
ﬁeld area subtended by all stimuli was equivalent in the latter 2
conditions (i.e., a large single face/object vs. 10 medium-sized
faces/objects; both 55.95 degrees2).
Experiment 3. Thirty different images of face and nonface every-
day objects were presented, which were independent of those
used in Experiments 1 and 2. Stimulus size (0.31 vs. 70.50 de-
grees2), eccentricity (10° vs. 15° vs. 20°), and laterality (left vs.
right) were systematically varied between blocks. To maximize
the visual ﬁeld extent (24.8°), the ﬁxation point was positioned
near either the left (50% of runs) or the right edges of the screen
within a given run, and it remained at the same location through-
out each block. At the beginning of each run, the subject had suf-
ﬁcient time to locate and ﬁxate the ﬁxation point; then the
scanning started.
Experiment 4A. Twenty different images of face and nonface
everyday objects were presented randomly within each experi-
ment block. Stimuli size varied across the blocks (i.e., small vs.
large; 0.34 degrees2 vs. 184.29 degrees2, respectively).
Experiment 4B. The stimuluswas a radial checkerboard (127.60 de-
grees2) in which each check reversed in contrast every 1 s (i.e.,
0.5 Hz).
Figure 1. Stimulus examples and results in Experiments 1A and 1B. Stimuli consisted of everyday objects, faces, and geometrical shapes (A), presented within different
blocks. (B) The group-averaged activity maps from lateral (top) and medial (bottom) views. Preferential responses to either large (blue to cyan) or small (red to yellow)
stimuli are based on P-values, using random-effect analysis, corrected for multiple comparisons. (C) The results of ROI analysis in LIM, in comparison with the
responses in well-established visual areas including V1, FFA, LOC, TOS, and PPA. Error bars indicate 1 standard error of the mean.
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Tasks. Experiments 1–3.Tominimizepossiblevariations in the level
of attention across trials, subjectswere instructed to detect a small
translucent target dot thatwaspresented brieﬂy in any location on
the screen, during concurrent central ﬁxation. Target translucency
(effectively, local contrast) was adjusted automatically using a
staircase method converging on an accuracy of 75% correct.
Experiment 4A. In each run, subjects were instructed to either
detect a change in the central ﬁxation spot (50% of blocks) or per-
form amore spatially distributed dot-detection task as in Experi-
ments 1–3. Task order was pseudo-random. For both tasks, the
level of task difﬁculty was controlled by incrementally adjusting
the color or luminance contrast of the target dot, such that re-
sponse accuracy converged to 75%.
Experiment 4B. Subjectswere required to detect a luminance-vary-
ing dot that was presented at a range of unpredictable locations.
At the beginning of each block, subjects were cued with a mes-
sage on the screen (4 s duration) indicating that the target dot ap-
pearedwithin ether: 1) a central disk (i.e., 0–1° radius) or 2) amid-
eccentric ring (1–10°), or 3) the sum of spatial extents 1 and 2 (0–
10°). A staircase method was used to control the dot contrast so
that the subject’s detection accuracy converged to 75% correct
across all conditions. Subjects had adequate time to practice
Figure 2. (A) Stimulus examples and results in Experiment 2. Stimuli were single small, medium, large, and multiple medium faces and nonface objects, independent of
those used in Experiment 1 (seeMethods). (B) The results of group-averaged activity analysis in LIM andwell-established visual areas. Other details are similar to those in
Figure 1.
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prior to the scans, and the experiment started when subjects felt
conﬁdent about task performance.
Imaging Procedure
All human subjects were scanned in a horizontal 3T scanner
(Siemens Tim Trio). Gradient echo EPI sequences were used to
acquire functional images (TR 2000 ms, TE 30 ms, ﬂip angle 90°,
3.0 mm isotropic voxels, and 33 axial slices). In the fMRI scans,
the ﬁeld of view included the whole brain, for all subjects. In all
experiments, each subject participated in 12 runs and each run
included 12 blocks. The same parameters were used for the rest-
ing state scans (6 min duration) during which subjects were
required to close their eyes and lie still (i.e., in a resting state).
A 3D MP-RAGE sequence (1.0 mm isotropic) was also used to
acquire high-resolution anatomical images from the same sub-
jects, for use in surface reconstruction.
Experiments with Nonhuman Primates
Subjects
Three adult macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta; 4–7 kg; 1 female
[M3]) were used. Animal care and experimental procedures con-
formed to the European and NIH guidelines and were approved
by the local ethical committee. The animals were pretrained on
a continuous ﬁxation task and prepared for awake, contrast-
agent enhanced fMRI experiments, as described previously (Van-
duffel et al. 2001). Two monkeys were also trained on a second
task, based on dot detection (Experiment 7B).
Stimuli. Images included faces (20 images), nonface everyday ob-
jects (40 images) and irregular shapes (20 images), identical to
those used in Experiment 1A. In each scan session, trials were
blocked according to stimulus category (i.e., faces vs. nonface ob-
jects vs. irregular shapes) and size (i.e., small vs. large; 0.34 vs.
67.33 degrees2, respectively). Twenty-eight images were pre-
sented during each block, and each image was presented for 1 s.
Stimuli for the independent face localizer were presented in a
block design (block duration: 20 s), including 6 stimulus categor-
ies: monkey faces, monkey bodies, objects, mammals, birds, and
fruits (further details in Popivanov et al. 2012). All stimuli had an
averaged radius of 5° of the visual ﬁeld. Each block included 20
different images from a single category, and each individual
stimulus was presented 2 times per block for 500 ms, in pseu-
do-random order.
Tasks. During Experiment 7A and during acquisition of the inde-
pendent face localizer data, monkeys were rewarded with water-
diluted juice for maintaining ﬁxation within a square-shaped
central ﬁxation window (typically, 2° × 2° in size) surrounding
the ﬁxation spot.
In Experiment 7B, the same stimuli were shown in exactly the
same block design, compared with Experiment 7A. During this
task, each animal was required to detect a small white square
(0.7°–1°) that was presented at a range of unpredictable locations
throughout the full extent of the screen (40° × 30°). Monkeys had
to respond within 50 to 1000 ms following the appearance of the
target square by releasing a lever. The size of the squarewas cho-
sen so that the animals achieved a response accuracy of 80% dur-
ing the scanning session.
Imaging Procedure.The animalswereﬁxed in the “sphinx”position
inside a plastic box using a MR-compatible physical head re-
straint (Vanduffel et al. 2001). Functional volumes were acquired
in a 3T Siemens TIM Trio scanner. A gradient echo EPI sequence
was used to acquire functional images (TR 2000 ms, TE 17 ms, ﬂip
angle 75°, 1.25 mm isotropic voxels, and 40 axial slices). Formon-
key M1 and M2, we increased the scan sensitivity by using a gra-
dient insert coil (Siemens AC88) with a gradient echo EPI
sequence (TR 1400 ms, TE 10 ms, 1.25 mm isotropic voxels, and
40 slices). Functional data were collected with a coil (8-channel,
receive only, phased-array coil with a local radial transmit coil).
Immediately prior to each scanning session, an iron oxide con-
trast agent (SInerem, Guerbet) was injected into the femoral/sa-
phenous vein (8–11 mg/kg). Each monkey scan session included
7–16 functional runs, and each run included 36 blocks (block dur-
ation 28 s.). For monkey M3, only small and large stimuli were
presented, and each functional run consisted of 18 blocks. Each
monkey was scanned for 3–8 sessions in Experiment 7A. Mon-
keys M1 and M2 were scanned for 2–3 sessions in Experiment
7B, and data for each experiment were averaged together. As in
the human task, all monkey subjects were required to ﬁxate a
small (0.1° diameter) spot at the center of the display screen,
near-continuously. Eye positionwasmonitored using an infrared
pupil tracking system (ISCAN, Inc.).
Data Analysis
Functional and anatomical data from both human and monkey
subjects were preprocessed and analyzed using FreeSurfer and
FS-FAST (version 5.3; http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/ (Fischl
2012). For each human andmonkey subject, we reconstructed the
cortical surface based on the high-resolution anatomical data
(Fischl et al. 1999). All functional images were corrected for mo-
tion artifact and then spatially smoothed using a 3D Gaussian
kernel (2.5-mm HWHM in humans and 1-mm HWHM in mon-
keys), and normalized across scans. To estimate the intensity of
thehemodynamic response, amodel based on a γ functionwasﬁt
to the fMRI signal, and then, the average signal intensity maps
were calculated for each condition (Friston et al. 1999). Voxel-
wise statistical tests were conducted by computing contrasts
based on a univariate general linearmodel. Finally, the signiﬁcant
levelswere projected onto the inﬂated/ﬂattened cortex aftera rigid
co-registration of functional and anatomical volumes.
To generate group-averaged maps for human subjects, func-
tionalmapswere spatially normalized across sessions and across
subjects using Freesurfer. Next, activity within each individual’s
brain was spatially transformed onto the averaged human brain
using a spherical transformation (Fischl et al. 1999) and averaged
using random-effects models (Friston et al. 1999).
For monkeys, all functional maps were spatially normalized
across sessions and then spatially transformed onto the averaged
monkey brain using a spherical transformation (Fischl et al.
1999). An averaged monkey brain was generated based on an in-
dependent set of animals (Nasr et al. 2011). Details of this proced-
ure are reported elsewhere (Fischl et al. 1999). For each animal,
activity maps were then averaged using ﬁxed effects models
(Friston et al. 1999) and overlaid on the averagemonkey brain. De-
tails of this procedure are given elsewhere (Nasr et al. 2011).
ROI Analysis
For each human subject, we deﬁned regions of interest (ROIs) for
the scene-selective areas parahipocampal place area (PPA), trans-
verse occipital sulcus (TOS), and RSC, and retinotopic borders,
based on independent localizing stimuli (see above) at a thresh-
old level “of” P < 10−4. In all analyses, fMRI activity for each condi-
tion was measured relative to the activity during presentation of
a uniform gray stimulus (baseline). To test the effect of independ-
ent factors, we applied a repeated-measures ANOVA, with Green-
house–Geisser correction whenever the sphericity assumption
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was violated. Subsequent comparisons between individual con-
ditions were based on paired-sampled t-tests.
Group-averaged activity maps showed that all effects were
generated bilaterally, without any apparent difference between
left and right hemispheres. Thus, activity fromboth hemispheres
was averaged in all ROI analyses, to strengthen the power of the
statistical tests.
Functional Connectivity Analysis
Details of the functional connectivity analysis are reported else-
where (Nasr et al. 2013). Brieﬂy, for each subject, we removed
sources of variance of noninterest including all motion para-
meters measured during the motion correction procedure, the
mean whole-brain signal, the mean signal from the lateral ven-
tricles, and the mean signal from a region within the deep cere-
bral whitematter. Then, we extracted themean BOLD signal time
course for each region of interest (ROI). The correlation coefﬁcient
for each of these time courses was computed with the time
course for every voxel in the brain and then converted to z-va-
lues.Whole-brain z-mapswere then subjected to random-effects
analyses tomeasure statistical signiﬁcance across participants at
the group level. All analyses used Freesurfer (Fischl 2012).
Results
Experiment 1: A Size-Dependent Activity Decrease in
Lateral Intermediate Cortex
Experiment 1A: Small vs. Large Stimuli
To test for hypothetical cortical regions in which activity de-
creased in response to retinally larger (compared with smaller)
visual stimuli, we measured fMRI activity in 17 human subjects
during presentation of small versus large stimuli (see Methods
and Fig. 1A). To maintain a consistent level and distribution of
spatial attention across the experimental conditions, subjects
were required to perform an unrelated (“dummy”) attention-re-
quiring task during presentation of the stimuli in all experiments
mentioned below, except as noted (see Methods).
Figure 1B and Supplementary Figure 1 show the resultant
group-averaged activity map in response to these large versus
small stimuli, based on random-effect analysis, in both hemi-
spheres. As expected, the larger visual stimuli evoked a corres-
pondingly stronger response throughout well-established visual
cortex. Based on additional localizing scans (see Methods), these
visual areas ranged from early retinotopic areas (V1/V2/V3)
through higher-level category-selective areas including the fusi-
form face area (FFA) (Kanwisher et al. 1997; Nasr and Tootell
2012), the (PPA) (Epstein and Kanwisher 1998; Nasr et al. 2011),
the TOS (Grill-Spector 2003; Dilks et al. 2013), the lateral occipital
complex (LOC; Malach et al. 1995; Grill-Spector et al. 2001), and
even a small visually driven sitewithin the anterior temporal cor-
tex (AT; Rajimehr et al. 2009; Nasr and Tootell 2012; Avidan et al.
2014). Consistent with our hypothesis, activity in the DMN core
areas (i.e., PCC and mPFC) decreased in response to retinally lar-
ger (rather than smaller) visual stimuli (Fig. 1B).
In addition to the DMN core areas, this bias for smaller stimuli
was also strongly evident in the posterior portion of superior tem-
poral cortex (STC), in the vicinity of previously described LTC,
which is the DMN subarea of interest here (Andrews-Hanna
et al. 2010). At a threshold of P < 10−2, we found that the cortical re-
gion showing the size-inverted response included portions of the
ANG, and theposteriorportionof theSTS, and the superior/medial
temporal gyrus. At higher thresholds, this region had a more pat-
chy topography, centered in the STS (Talairach coordinates left:
−48, −52, 8; right: 46, −45, 11). This decrease for larger stimuli
was found relatively consistently in 32 of 34 scannedhemispheres
(Supplementary Fig. 2) and also across runs (Supplementary
Fig. 3). To distinguish this size-deﬁned region fromother function-
ally or anatomically deﬁned sites in this cortical vicinity, we refer
to the region of decreased responses to larger (relative to small)
stimuli as the LIM region, because it is located roughly intermedi-
ate to the occipital, parietal, and temporal cortex. As amnemonic,
“LIM” can also stand for “Less (visual stimulus) IsMore (fMRI activ-
ity)” (see also Anticevic et al. 2010).
Consistentwith the neuroimaging studies of visual search,we
also found decreased activity in response to large (comparedwith
small) visual objects, located within the TPJ (Corbetta et al. 2000;
Shulman et al. 2007)mainly in the right hemisphere. This activity
decrease was centered within the posterior portion of the lateral
ﬁssure and inferior parietal surpramarginal sulcus. This activity
decrease is mainly linked to ﬁltering of task irrelevant objects
during an active search task (Shulman et al. 2007).
Previous studies have reported visual face-selective activity in
the human STS (e.g., Haxby et al. 2000; Fox et al. 2009) and in the
nearby lateral occipital gyrus (Nasr et al. 2011). Accordingly, here
we tested for functional interactions and spatial overlap between
the size-related activity variation described earlier, relative to
category selectivity, in LIM and neighboring areas. As a control,
we independently measured the activity contrasts evoked by
small versus large everyday nonface objects, faces, and geomet-
rical patterns. Results of this control experiment showed no sig-
niﬁcant interaction in themap contrasting category- versus size-
selectivity in LIM, at a threshold of P < 0.01. Thus, at least in these
measurements, the LIM topography produced by all 3 stimuli
overlapped. As an additional validation, we found that the con-
trast of large faces versus large objects (Supplementary Fig. 4)
conﬁrmed the expected face-selective bias in the FFA; this ruled
out the possibility that the effects reported earlier were due to in-
effective stimulation by these speciﬁc face and nonface objects.
Further analyses of the relationship of LIM to category selectivity
are described later, in Experiment 5.
Experiment 1B: Size Response Function in LIM and Visual Cortex
To deﬁne the LIM size function in greater detail, we scanned the
brain activity of 12 subjects in response to objects (including face
and nonface objects, independent of those used above) in which
the size (surface area) was systematically varied from 0° (i.e., a
uniform gray screen, used as a baseline condition) through 0.04,
0.34, 11.40, and 181.66 degrees2, across different blocks. For each
subject, the borders of LIM (i.e., the ROI) were deﬁned using the
results of the previous small versus large stimuli (see Experiment
1A, and Methods). For comparison, we also measured the size
gain function in well-documented visual cortical areas V1, LOC,
FFA, TOS, and PPA. All activity wasmeasured relative to that pro-
duced during presentation of a spatially uniform gray screen.
Figure 1C shows the results. Consistent with the results in Ex-
periment 1A, application of a 1 factor repeated-measures ANOVA
to the ROI activity showed that activity in all these well-estab-
lished visual areas increased signiﬁcantly and progressively
with increases in stimulus size (F3,33 > 8.22, P < 10
−3). In contrast,
LIM showed the opposite pattern: activity decreased systematic-
ally in response to the large visual objects, compared with the
smaller ones (F3,33 = 15.19, P < 10
−5).
Experiment 2: Object Size vs. Number
In the absence of other data, it could be argued that the LIM re-
sponses depend not on object size per se (e.g., the averaged
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surface area), but instead on the summed extent of the visual
ﬁeld encompassed by the stimulus. The latter is a more general-
ized sensory interpretation, which is in factmore consistent with
our original hypothesis. That latter idea predicts that increases in
either the number of objects, or the size of objects, should both
produce decrease responses in LIM. Conversely, early retinotopic
visual areas should show an opposite response; increases in ei-
ther the size or number of objects (or both) should all increase
the response amplitudes.
To test this idea, we measured fMRI responses in nine human
subjects to presentation of face and nonface objects with the fol-
lowing conﬁgurations: 1) a single small object (0.51 degrees2 visual
ﬁeld area), 2) a single medium object (5.59 degrees2), 3) a single
large object (55.95 degrees2), and 4) 10 medium-sized objects pre-
sented concurrently (summed visual ﬁeld area = 55.95 degrees2)
(Fig. 2A). Importantly, the total visual ﬁeld area subtended by the
stimuli was equivalent in the latter 2 conditions (i.e., 1 large single
vs. 10medium-sized stimuli; both totaling 55.95 degrees2 of visual
ﬁeld extent). As in Experiment 1B, amplitudewas calculated based
on responses to the presentation of the baseline condition, a uni-
form gray (i.e., a stimulus of 0 degrees2).
Consistent with the results in Experiments 1A and 1B, we
found a signiﬁcant decrease in LIM activitywhen the size of a sin-
gle object was increased (Fig. 2; F2,16 = 6.95, P < 0.01). Importantly,
this experiment also showed that the LIM response to a single
large object did not differ signiﬁcantly from its response to 10me-
dium-sized objects (t8 = 0.96, P = 0.37), when both stimuli had
equivalent summed visual ﬁeld area. This result suggests that
LIM activity inversely reﬂects the visual ﬁeld extent occupied by
the sum of the tested visual stimuli on the screen at a given time,
rather than the size of a given object per se. This more general
interpretation is consistent with our basic hypothesis that stron-
ger visual stimulation (e.g., increases in either the size or num-
ber of visually presented objects) produces decreased activity
in DMN-related areas. For clarity, we nevertheless refer to
the main experimental value as “size” (rather than “visual ﬁeld
area”) below, when the experimental manipulations were based
on the size of a single object at a given time.
Consistent with the results in Experiments 1A and B, occipital
and inferior temporal visual areas (including V1, FFA, LOC, TOS,
and PPA) showed a signiﬁcantly higher response to progressively
larger objects, compared with smaller objects (F2,16 > 8.31, P <
0.01). Among these comparison visual areas, LOC (t8 = 2.39, P =
0.04) and FFA (t8 = 2.17, P = 0.06) showed a marginally higher re-
sponse to a single large object, compared with 10 medium-
sized objects of equal summed visual ﬁeld area. However, the re-
sponses evoked by a single large object vs. 10 medium size ob-
jects were not differentiable in the other tested visual areas
(t8 < 1.46, P > 0.18). Thus, generally, responses in well-established
visual cortex scaled with variations in visual ﬁeld area, with a re-
sponse sign opposite to that in LIM.
Experiment 3: Visual Field Position
In Experiments 1A and 1B, the stimuli were centered in the visual
ﬁeld; thus, the “size” effect was not accompanied by co-varia-
tions in averaged stimulus eccentricity (i.e., angular distance
from the center of gaze). Nevertheless, it might be argued that
1) the decreasing or increasing object sizes recruited a narrower
or broader range of eccentricities, biased toward the foveal/per-
ipheral regions in the visual ﬁeld (respectively) and that 2) some-
how this retinotopic variation inﬂuenced (or even produced) the
apparent size effect. To address this overall possibility, Experi-
ment 3 tested the LIM size function in 13 human subjects across
variations in averaged visual ﬁeld eccentricity (see Methods and
Fig. 3A,B).
Figure 3C shows the activity measured in LIM and additional
control areas. Application of a three-factor repeated-measures
ANOVA (size [0.35 vs. 70.50 degrees2], eccentricity [10° vs. 15° vs.
20°], and laterality [ipsilateral vs. contralateral]) to the activity
in LIM conﬁrmed a signiﬁcantly decreased response to larger
(compared with smaller) stimuli (F1,12 = 28.24, P < 10
−3). We did
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of stimulus eccentricity (F2,24 = 1.11, P
= 0.35) or laterality (F1,12 = 0.63, P = 0.44) on the level of LIM activ-
ity. However, the interaction between the effects of size and
laterality was signiﬁcant (F1,12 = 11.59, P < 0.01), and the effect of
size on LIM activity was stronger in the contralateral rather
than the ipsilateral hemisphere. Thus, the activity decrease
in LIM in response to larger stimuli was largely independent of
stimulus eccentricity, within the range tested here (5.25°–24.75°
[i.e., minimum–maximum eccentricities]).
As expected, activity in established visual areas increased sig-
niﬁcantly when stimuli were presented either at larger size (F1,12
> 11.03, P < 0.01) or nearer to the fovea (F2,24 > 13.97, P < 10
−3)
(Fig. 3C). Moreover, unlike the size effect in LIM, the effect of
size in V1 (F2,24 = 14.07, P < 10
−4), LOC (F2,24 = 5.23, P = 0.01, FFA
(F2,24 = 3.97, P = 0.03), and TOS (F2,24 = 4.04, P = 0.03) but not in
PPA (F2,24 = 1.18, P = 0.32) was larger when stimuli were located
nearer rather than farther from the foveal representation. Also,
consistent with known functional properties, all tested visual
cortical areas showed a stronger response in the contralateral
hemisphere, compared with the ipsilateral hemisphere (F1,12 >
8.46, P < 0.01).
Experiment 4: Central vs. Spatially Distributed Attention
Experiment 4A: Comparison Across Tasks
Experiments 1–3 showed a systematic and inverse inﬂuence
of visual stimulation on LIM responses, using an indepen-
dent task to stabilize possible co-variations in attention. To com-
plement these tests of sensory-driven activity, we next tested
whether experimental manipulations in spatial attention
would inﬂuence LIM activity.
Eleven human subjects were scanned during presentation of
large versus small visual objects. Across different scan blocks,
subjects were cued to detect changes in contrast (color or lumi-
nance; see Methods) in a target dot, which was located either 1)
at the center of the screen, or 2) distributed unpredictably and
randomly across the display screen (i.e., similar to the dummy
dot-detection task used in Experiments 1–3). Thus, in these 2
tasks, spatial attention was either distributed across the screen,
or focused centrally. The level of difﬁculty for both tasks con-
verged to 75% using a staircase method (see Methods).
Figure 4 shows the resultant group-averaged brain activity in
response to large versus small stimuli during spatially distribu-
ted (Fig. 4A) versus foveally centered (Fig. 4B) attention. We
found that the expected size-dependent decrease was greatly re-
duced during central attention, comparedwith spatially distribu-
ted attention. Application of a two-factor repeated-measures
ANOVA to the activity measured within LIM (Fig. 4C) showed a
signiﬁcant effect of task (F1,10 = 32.28, P < 10
−3), stimulus size (F1,10
= 22.02, P < 10−3), and a signiﬁcant interaction between the effects
of stimulus size and task (F1,10 = 32.30, P < 10
−3). Although add-
itional factors may contribute (see below), these results suggest
that spatially distributed attention enhances the size-dependent
response in LIM.
Again, the pattern of activity in well-established visual areas
was quite different than the pattern of activity in LIM. In visual
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cortex, we found signiﬁcantly stronger activity in response to lar-
ger compared with smaller stimuli (F1,10 > 18.17, P < 0.01). All
tested visual areas except for V1 (F1,10 > 0.49, P = 0.51) showed a
signiﬁcant interaction between the effect of stimulus size and
task (F1,10 > 21.77, P < 10
−3). However, in contrast to LIM, this inter-
action arose mainly from an increased response to the smaller
stimuli during central rather than distributed attention. Areas
FFA (F1,10 > 11.05, P < 0.01) and LOC (F1,10 > 17.70, P < 0.01) showed
Figure 3. Stimuli and results in Experiment 3. Stimuli were everydayobjects and faces, independent of those used in Experiments 1 and 2 (A). Stimuli were presented in the
periphery of the visual ﬁeld, and subjects were instructed to maintain ﬁxation on a target presented either on the left (B) or the right side of the screen. The distance
between the stimulus (presented by dashed circles) and the ﬁxation spot was systematically varied across blocks. (C) The results of ROI analysis. The eccentricity of
the stimulus center is indicated on the x-axis. Other details are as in Figure 1.
Figure 4. Group-averaged activity maps showing areas that responded preferentially to small (red-yellow) or large (blue-cyan) stimuli, during spatially distributed (A) or
centrally focused (B) attention. The border of LIM is deﬁned based on independent scans (Experiment 1) in the same pool of subjects. (C) The results of the ROI analysis in
LIM and in well-established visual areas. Other details are similar to those in Figure 1.
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a signiﬁcant effect of task, but we found no signiﬁcant difference
between the 2 tasks in the level of activity within V1 (F1,10 > 2.90,
P = 0.12), PPA (F1,10 > 2.66, P = 0.13) or TOS (F1,10 = 2.37, P = 0.16).
Experiment 4B: Common Task
In the above experiment, it could be argued that residual differ-
ences in the nature of the 2 tasks could have inﬂuenced the re-
sults. Therefore, we scanned 13 subjects in a control experiment
during which subjects were required to detect a luminance-
varying dot that was presented at a range of unpredictable loca-
tions. Those locations were conﬁned within either: 1) a central
disk (i.e., 0–1° radius) or 2) a mid-eccentric ring (1–10°) or 3) the
sum of spatial extents 1 plus 2 (0–10°). Thus, spatial attention
was most centered in Condition 1. In all 3 conditions, the target
dot was presented on a large radial checkerboard (Supplementary
Fig. 5), reversing in contrast at 1 Hz. Subjects were cued to the
eccentricity range of the target dot at the beginning of each
block (see Methods). Using a staircase method similar to the one
in Experiments 1–3 and 4A, task performance converged to 75%
correct across all conditions. LIM activity was measured relative
to a baseline condition of uniform gray background (i.e., no
checkerboard), during which the subjects were required to ﬁxate
the ﬁxation spot without an explicit task (i.e., passive ﬁxation).
Consistent with the results of Experiment 4A, we found a sig-
niﬁcant effect of the distribution of spatial attention on the LIM re-
sponse level (F2,24 = 3.49, P = 0.04). The LIM response to the large
checkerboard was reduced during the 2 conditions involving
wider spatial attention (i.e., Conditions 2 and 3), compared with
the more centered condition (i.e., Condition 1). Thus, despite the
experimental differences between Experiments 4A and 4B, both
sets of results indicate that spatially distributed attention en-
hances the distinctive response decrease to larger stimuli in LIM.
Experiment 5: Meta-Analysis
Numerous studies have reported category-selective activity in
the vicinity of LIM, including visually driven selectivity for faces
or biological motion in STS, and/or a cognitively driven site se-
lective for ToM (for review, see Allison et al. 2000; Spreng et al.
2009; Kanwisher 2010). To relate our ﬁndings more directly to
those in the literature, we co-localized the group-averaged size-
selective localizer for LIM (Experiment 1) to a meta-analysis of
data from the above reports, and to additional data from our
laboratory.
Experiment 5A: Selectivity for Faces
Figure 5A shows the location of face- (or gaze-) selective sites re-
ported in the literature (small solid squares; Table 1). In addition,
we plotted the center of higher face selectivity in the STS, based
on our data in Experiment 1A (white circle in Fig. 5A) (see also
Supplementary Fig. 4). Such face-related sites were clustered in
the anterior/ventral portion of LIM, within the STS. Moreover,
the face-selective site in our data was located in the middle of
that cluster. Thus, locations in our data were consistent with
those in the literature.
Experiment 5B: Selectivity for Biological Motion
Figure 5B shows the analogous comparison of LIM to the peaks of
activity that have been reported to represent biological motion
(see also Table 2). In addition, we plotted the data from an add-
itional experiment conducted in our laboratory, in which re-
sponses to point-light displays of biological motion (Johansson
1973) were contrastedwith translational (“planar,” a form of non-
biological) motion (see Methods), using stimuli identical to those
used in a previous study of biological motion (Jastorff and Orban
2009). The cluster of peaks in this biological motion meta-ana-
lysis and the peak activity in our biological motion experiment
were mainly located in the STS, within the borders of LIM as de-
ﬁned here. However, the meta-analysis clustering for biological
motion (Fig. 5B) was distributed more variably, compared with
that for faces (Fig. 5A).
Experiment 5C: Selectivity for ToM
Figure 5C shows the analogous meta-analysis of published sites
involved in the processing of ToM on the superior temporal
gyrus. The reported ToM sites (Table 3) were locatedmore dorsal-
ly in the superior temporal gyrus (rather than in the sulcus), but
still within the borders of LIM.
Overall, the results of this meta-analysis show complemen-
tary features. On one hand, all 3 of these category-selective
tests (face, biological motion, and ToM selectivity) activated
sites within LIM, when LIM was deﬁned in our experiments at a
relatively low threshold (e.g., Fig. 1 [P < 10−2]). On the other
hand, the 3 different functionally deﬁned sites appeared to be
in different locations within LIM, within the limits of this meta-
analysis. Thus, these results suggest that size-deﬁned LIM may
well include functionally distinct subdivisions. Previous meta-
analyses also reported functional subdivisions in this general re-
gion, although they did not deﬁne LIM (e.g., Allison et al. 2000;
Spreng et al. 2009; Kanwisher 2010; Denny et al. 2012).
Experiment 6: Functional Connectivity
To clarify the circuitryof LIM, Experiment 6mapped the function-
al connectivity of LIM relative to that in well-established visual
and DMN areas, by measuring resting-state BOLD signal ﬂuctua-
tions in 24 human subjects (see Methods). The seed regions for
LIM and PCC were deﬁned based on the results of Experiment
1. The seed regions for visual areas were deﬁned based on an in-
dependent set of localizer stimuli in independent scan sessions
(see Methods). To avoid uncontrolled variation between areas
due to a common sensory input, subjects were instructed to
keep their eyes closed throughout the functional connectivity
scans.
Figure 6 and Supplementary Figure 6 show the resultant
maps. Consistent with the previous reports of human STS con-
nectivity (Yeo et al. 2011), LIM showed a strong (positive) func-
tional connection with anterior STS. Also, as one would expect
in a DMN subarea (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010), LIM showed a
strong functional connection with DMN core areas (i.e., PCC
and mPFC) plus lateral frontal areas. LIM also showed a negative
functional connection with parietal/insular cortex and early
visual cortical areas. Consistent with the other evidence for a
link between LIM and DMN-related regions, seeding of PCC
revealed a strong functional connection between PCC and
the dorsal posterior portion of LIM. The restriction of the connec-
tions to the dorsal posterior region of LIM is further evidence (see
Experiments 5A-C) for functional subdivisions within size-
deﬁned LIM.
In contrast, the functional connections of the classic visual
areas differed strikingly from those in LIM. At a threshold of P =
10−2.5, the positive functional connections from seeds in each vis-
ual cortical area were largely limited to other areas within visual
cortex. In contrast to LIM, all tested visual areas except FFA
showed “negative” functional connection with DMN areas, and
with the lateral frontal cortex (see also Chadick and Gazzaley
2011). However, at a lower threshold of P < 10−2.5, many mid-
level visual areas (especially MT) showed a signiﬁcant positive
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functional connection to a small common anterior/ventral por-
tion of LIM. This functional connection data further supported
the above evidence that LIM is a heterogeneous area.
To further test this possibility, we divided LIM arbitrarily into
3 areas of roughly equal size along the anterior–posterior axis and
measured the functional connection of each subdivision relative
to the rest of the brain (Supplementary Fig. 7). The results showed
clear differences in functional connections between these 3 sub-
divisions of LIM (Fig. 7).
Speciﬁcally, the posterior third of LIM showed the highest
level of positive functional connection with the DMN main
hubs (i.e., PCC and mPFC). It also showed a strong “negative”
functional connection with the mid-level occipital temporal
visual areas, plus dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and
central and insular cortex. Despite the low threshold used in
this analysis (P < 0.05), the negative functional connection be-
tween the posterior LIM and areaV1was limited to the peripheral
(not including the foveal) representation in V1.
The functional connections of middle/anterior portions of
LIM showed 4 major differences relative to those of posterior
LIM. First, middle, and anterior LIM showed weak (or no) func-
tional connection to dACC, or central or insular cortex. Second,
middle, and anterior LIM showed weaker functional connections
Figure 5. Co-localization of LIM relative to the reported peaks of activity in previous studies describing selectivity for faces (A) and biologicalmotion (B) in STS (see Tables 1
and 2). The location of LIMwas based on the results of Experiment 1. Thepeaks of activity to face- and biologicalmotion-selective localizers in our subjects are indicated by
white circles, in A and B, respectively. (C) The reported peaks of activity during ToM tasks, relative to the borders of LIM (see Table 3).
Table 1 Location of peaks of face-selective response within the
posterior STS reported in previous studies
−53 −34 5 49 −39 9 Pinsk et al. 2009
−39 −65 17 47 −63 13
−47 −48 8
−50 −55 8 53 −44 4 Fox et al. 2009
−51 −52 6 51 −41 4
−49 −61 16 50 −45 16 Hooker et al. 2003
−55 −60 10 52 −48 8 Engell and Haxby 2007
−54 −48 4 53 −45 7 Ishai et al. 2005
−56 −46 12 54 −42 8 Furl et al. 2011
−51 −49 6 46 −44 6 Avidan et al. 2014
−54 −38 6 48 −38 4 Julian et al. 2012
−57 −45 6 54 −33 3 Schultz et al. 2013
60 −51 9 Liu et al. 2010
48 −34 2 Thompson et al. 2007
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with DMN main hubs (i.e., PCC and mPFC) compared with the
posterior LIM. Third, anterior/middle portions of LIM showed a
“positive” (rather than “negative”) functional connection with
mid-level visual areas. Fourth, anterior, and middle portions of
LIM showed “negative” functional connection to area V1. How-
ever, in contrast to the posterior LIM, the latter functional
connectionwasmainlywith the foveal rather than the peripheral
portion of this retinotopic area. The latter 2 differences were
more prominent in the right hemisphere. Notably, this negative
functional connection with area V1 was found only in LIM, and
none of the tested visual areas showed such anegative functional
connection with area V1.
Figure 6. Functional connectivity of LIM and adjacent visual areas, including TOS, LOC, and FFA, illustrated in the right hemisphere. The bottom panel shows the
functional connectivity of PCC. Black lines show the borders of LIM. The white arrowhead indicates the anterior/ventral part of LIM, which shows a positive functional
connection with the FFA, TOS, and LOC. In each panel, black asterisks indicate the center of the seeded area.
Figure 7. Functional connectivitymap of posterior (left); middle (center) and anterior (right) LIM, overlaid on ﬂattened right (top) and left (bottom) hemispheres. Asterisks
mark the center of the seeded area in each map. Probabilistic borders of area V1 (Hinds et al. 2008) are also indicated with a black line.
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Experiment 7: LIM in Macaque Monkeys
To test for evidence of an LIM homolog inmacaques, we ﬁrst pre-
dicted the location of LIM in the macaque cortical map, based on
the topographic projection of corresponding visual cortical areas
in human cortex using Caret (Van Essen et al. 2001). This projec-
tion was accomplished using a landmark-based deformation.
Tethering points included both functionally mapped areas (V1,
V2, and MT) plus anatomical landmarks (the central sulcus,
rhinal sulcus, and sylvian ﬁssures). First, human and monkey
brain landmarks were registered precisely to each other. Then,
the remaining cortical areas were mapped from the human
map to the macaque, as constrained by the tethering areas and
the cortical surface limits (for further details, see Van Essen
et al. (2001)). This approach has been used previously to predict
the location of presumptively common visual cortical areas in-
cluding lateral occipital complex and anterior face areas, by
translating map information from humans to macaques, and
vice versa (e.g., Tsao et al. 2003; Van Essen 2005; Rajimehr et al.
2009). That projection is shown in Figure 8. Based on this map-
ping approach, a hypothetical macaque homolog of LIM should
be located immediately anterior to macaque MT+ (i.e., anterior
to MSTd; e.g., Nelissen et al. 2006).
Experiment 7A: Fixation Only
In our ﬁrst test, we scanned 3 macaque monkeys whereas they
ﬁxated a small target spot, during presentation of a diagnostic
subset of the stimuli used in Experiment 1A (see Methods). Stim-
uli were blocked according to size (large vs. small) and image cat-
egory (faces vs. nonface objects), in a 2 × 2 design.
Results of this experiment are shown in Figure 9. Unlike the
results in human subjects, we did not ﬁnd a sizable cortical re-
gion showing decreased fMRI response to retinally large (com-
pared with small) stimuli, in the cortical location predicted by
the cortical projection of human LIM onto macaque cortex.
That is, this experiment did not reveal any obvious homolog of
human LIM, in any of the 6 hemispheres tested.
Table 2 Location of peak of biomotion-selective response within the
posterior STS reported in previous studies
−39 −59 15 47 −56 15 Beauchamp et al. 2003
−41 −52 11 46 −49 12 Grossman and Blake 2002
−45 −56 14 59 −42 19 Carter and Pelphrey 2006
−45 −58 8 Schnell et al. 2007
−46 −54 14 Saygin et al. 2004
−47 −61 23 42 −58 20 Schubotz and von Cramon 2004
−48 −46 4 54 −50 4 Calvert and Campbell 2003
−48 −46 6 51 −54 10 Grosbras and Paus 2006
−51 −44 10 63 −36 13 Grèzes et al. 2003
−52 −50 14 58 −42 6 Dubeau et al. 2001
−52 −59 9 59 −37 20 Gobbini et al. 2007
−53 −42 13 Pierno et al. 2006
−54 −44 12 Villarreal et al. 2008
−55 −47 2 55 −54 6 Costantini et al. 2005
−59 −42 9 52 −36 5 Pelphrey et al. 2005
38 −58 14 Hamilton and Grafton 2006
44 −68 10 Vaina et al. 2001
46 −46 11 David et al. 2008
50 −43 4 Wheaton et al. 2004
50 −48 2 Gazzola et al. 2006
50 −40 20 Gazzola et al. 2007
52 −37 6 Sakreida et al. 2005
52 −61 8 Morris et al. 2005
55 −51 27 Ramnani and Miall 2004
56 −46 13 Peuskens et al. 2005
57 −41 21 Peelen et al. 2006
57 −45 16 Bidet-Caulet et al. 2005
62 −37 21 Leslie et al. 2004
63 −44 2 Santi et al. 2003
63 −39 6 Makuunchi 2005
64 −52 5 Johnson-Frey et al. 2005
64 −40 9 Ohnishi et al. 2004
Table 3 Location of peak of ToM-related responsewithin the posterior
STS reported in previous studies
−42 −61 27 55 −49 30 Young et al. 2007
−48 −54 30 53 −54 28 Perner et al. 2006
−53 −57 22 53 −49 19
−49 −59 21 Heekeren et al. 2003
−55 −59 20 Heekeren et al. 2005
−63 −47 23 64 −49 26 Kobayashi et al. 2007
−59 −50 14 Robertson et al. 2007
−50 −58 20 58 −52 22 Dodell-Feder et al. 2011
−54 −50 18 52 −48 20 Sebastian et al. 2011
−53 −59 24 57 −56 26 Gobbini et al. 2007
−50 −64 35 Prehn et al. 2008
−51 −55 27 55 −51 28 Young and Saxe 2008
−50 −54 28 Saxe and Powell 2006
−56 −52 26 58 −52 28 Young et al. 2010
−54 −60 21 51 −54 27 Saxe and Kanwisher 2003
34 −51 25 Sommer et al. 2007
41 −47 22 Moll et al. 2002
46 −49 19 Greene et al. 2004
60 −46 22 Gallagher et al. 2000
53 −51 19 Hynes et al. 2006
53 −48 27 Mitchell 2008
Figure 8. Topographic projection of the human data to predict the location of
putative LIM in macaque monkey, based on warping of the cortical surfaces.
The top 2 panels show the group-averaged activity map showing the inverted
size bias (red-through-yellow) based on the results from Experiment 1, in
inﬂated (A) and ﬂattened (B) views of the human brain. The bottom 2 panels
show the predicted location of LIM in the macaque, in corresponding inﬂated
(C) and ﬂattened (D) views of the macaque brain, shown in solid green.
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However, we did observe small regions located outside the
projected region of LIM, which showed “functional” similarities
to human LIM. It could be argued that such small patches re-
present “proto-homologues” of LIM, except for their anomalous
location outside the LIMprojection region (Fig. 8). These potential
proto-LIM patches were found in all 6 hemispheres (Fig. 9), based
on the large versus small localizer.
In the same 3 animals, the main (“middle” or “posterior”)
face patch (Pinsk et al. 2009; Rajimehr et al. 2009; Bell et al.
2011; Nasr et al. 2011) was also localized based either on the
same stimuli used in this test (in all hemispheres) or based on
a different set of stimuli (in 2 hemispheres; Supplementary
Fig. 8). In each of these 6 hemispheres, 1 of these proto-LIM
patches was located adjacent to the monkeys’ posterior face-
selective patch (Pinsk et al. 2009; Rajimehr et al. 2009; Bell et al.
2011; Nasr et al. 2011).
In addition, we found a patch that was located in the conﬂu-
ent foveal representation of V1/V2, in 5 of the 6 hemispheres in
which neural response levels decreased in response to the large
compared with the small stimuli. In a retrospective analysis, we
noted that some of our human subjects (12 of 34 tested hemi-
spheres) showed an analogous patch of activity in the foveal
representation of V1/V2, at low thresholds. Based on this and pre-
vious fMRI studies (e.g., Tootell et al. 1998), such foveal V1/V2
patches likely reﬂect a minor variability in ﬁxation stability
across conditions.
Figure 9. Results of Experiment 7A in 3 monkeys. (A) The approximate location of insets on a monkey brain with anatomical landmarks highlighted on the map. (B–D)
Regions that responded preferentially to small (rather than large) stimuli during passive ﬁxation (red-through-yellow). Stimuli were a subset of stimuli used in
Experiment 1, which included faces and nonface everyday objects. The locations of small functional patches that are functionally similar to human LIM are indicated
by white arrows. Based on the cortical projection, the predicted activity peak of LIM is indicated with a white asterisk. Black lines (E–G) show the borders of the
posterior face-selective patches located in the same hemispheres. STS, superior temporal sulcus; LS, lunate sulcus; IOS, inferior occipital sulcus; OTS, occipital
temporal sulcus; SF, sylvian ﬁssure.
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Experiment 7B: Fixation with Spatially Distributed Attention
Human experiments 4A and 4B suggested that the response
difference to small versus large objects (i.e., the LIM localizer) is
stronger during distributed (compared with more centralized)
attention. Thus, if an LIM homolog exists in macaques, its’ activ-
ity might be enhanced by constraining the monkey’s task to dis-
tribute attention more uniformly across the stimulus display.
To test this idea, we conducted further scans in 2 of the
monkeys using the same stimuli used in Experiment 7A, plus
an additional task constraint. The monkeys were trained to
perform an additional task (similar to the task performed by
humans in Experiments 1–3) that requiredmonkeys to distribute
their attention across the screen,while concurrentlymaintaining
their ﬁxation at the central ﬁxation spot (see Methods).
Figure 10A shows the resultant activitymaps. Consistent with
the results of Experiment 7A, we did not ﬁnd any obvious homo-
log of LIM in the predicted cortical region. However, again, these
experiments revealed a preference for small rather than large
objects in the same small patches localized in Experiment 7A,
in 3 of 4 hemispheres. Figure 10B also conﬁrms that these patches
were located immediately posterior to the monkey face patches,
as one would expect from transitivity.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that a speciﬁc cortical region (“LIM,”
located just anterior to classic dorsal visual cortex) is progressive-
ly and consistently de-activated by corresponding increases in
stimulated visual ﬁeld extent. Additional evidence suggests
that LIM is linked to visual cortex mainly through indirect and
higher order circuits, including the DMN core areas.
To What Extent is LIM Involved in Visual Processing?
Perceptually, larger objects are more easily detectable and recog-
nizable compared with smaller ones (Jolicoeur 1987). Consistent
with this perceptual effect, we found that larger (i.e., more sali-
ent) stimuli evoked stronger activity relative to smaller stimuli
(Figs 1–3), throughout well-established visual cortex, including
early retinotopic and higher-level category-selective (i.e., FFA,
PPA) areas. Conversely, LIM activity decreased signiﬁcantly in re-
sponse to large compared with small visual stimuli. Thus, the
LIM responsewas inverse to both the above psychophysics on sa-
lience and to the fMRI responses in classic visual cortex.
A similar conclusion arises frommanipulations of retinotopic
eccentricity. Psychophysically, objects presented in the periph-
ery are less likely to be detected by observers (Carrasco and
Chang 1995; Wolfe et al. 1998). Again these results are inconsist-
ent with our results in LIM, in which extensive manipulation of
retinotopic eccentricity did not signiﬁcantly reduce LIM activity.
Such results suggest that LIMmay not contribute directly to sen-
sory perception, although it may receive a small input from vis-
ual cortex (see Fig. 6 and below).
Self-Referential Processing in LIM
At face value, this hypothesis that LIM does not contribute in
sensory perception seems at odds with reports that (at least)
parts of STS and adjacent areas are involved in encoding face
and body motion (Fig. 5; also see Puce et al. 1998; Haxby et al.
2000; Beauchamp et al. 2003; Thompson et al. 2007; Jastorff and
Orban 2009). However, 1 unifying possibility is that LIM is in-
volved in self-referential processes.
Self-referential processes encode different aspects of “self”
such as the emotional self, the spatial self, the facial self, and
the social self (for review, see Northoff et al. 2006; Buckner et al.
2008). Presumably, neural processes underlying these self-refer-
ential functions are recruited when the task and/or stimuli are
experienced as related to one’s own person (Northoff et al. 2006).
Self-referential processing was initially linked to activity in
DMNmain hubs (Gusnard et al. 2001; Mitchell et al. 2006; Buckner
et al. 2008). However, recent studies (e.g., Pfeifer et al. 2007; An-
drews-Hanna et al. 2010) showed that activity within LTC is also
stronger during self-referential decision-making, compared with
control tasks. Furthermore, this study reported that the same
area is more active during metallization of the “present self” ra-
ther than “future self”. The activation during self-referential
tasks might reﬂect (at least partly) a higher semantic memory
Figure 10. Results of Experiment 7B in 2 monkeys. A and B show activity patches that responded preferentially to small rather than larger stimuli during an active task
comparable with the dot-detection task used in humans. The location of the posterior face-selective patches in the same hemispheres is shown in C and D. Other details
are similar to those in Figure 8.
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retrieval load during the self-referential compared with the con-
trol tasks (Cabeza and Nyberg 2000; Svoboda et al. 2006).
Consistent with this self-referential hypothesis, 1 interpret-
ation of our ﬁndings in Experiment 1–4 is that the “self-unre-
lated” stimuli used here produce varying levels of exogenous
attention. That is, our visual stimuli act like distracters, which
shift neural and attentional resources away from the self-
referential processes and toward sensory perception. According
to this idea, the effect in LIM should also vary systematically as a
function of the size/number of the visual stimuli—in accord with
our results. By extension, it could be argued that the face- and
body-motion-selective activity reported in this area (Fig. 5A,B)
arises secondarily from comparing these visual stimuli to self-re-
lated (internal) representations. However, further experiments are
necessary to test these hypotheses.
Distributed Attention and the Sentinel Hypothesis
Previous studies have suggested that DMN activity is linked to
low-level monitoring of the external environment, during
which subjects distribute their attention uniformly across the
visual ﬁeld (Ghatan et al. 1995, Shulman et al. 1997; Gusnard
et al. 2001; Gilbert et al. 2007; Hahn et al. 2007). According to
this “sentinel hypothesis,” themain difference between 1) the di-
rected task conditionswhich decrease activitywithin DMNand 2)
passive conditions which increase DMN activity is a difference in
the distribution of attention (i.e., focused vs. distributed) during
these 2 conditions.
Although our study was not designed to test different aspects
of the sentinel hypothesis, our results (Experiment 4) showed
that LIM size sensitivity appeared mainly when subjects distrib-
ute their attention throughout the visual ﬁeld, and it weakened
signiﬁcantly during focused attention. In contrast to LIM, all
classic visual areas showed size sensitivity during both central
and distributed attention. These results support the sentinel
hypothesis, in that the distribution of attention inﬂuences activ-
ity within LIM (a DMN subarea). However, in contrast to the pre-
diction of the sentinel hypothesis, the results of Experiment 4A
and 4B showed that the level of fMRI activity in LIM was higher
during focused (rather than distributed) attention. In other words,
although our results are consistent with the sentinel hypothesis
with regard to the overall importance of attentional state, that hy-
pothesis didnot correctlypredict the level of LIMactivity indifferent
attentional states.
“Suppression” of BOLD Responses in LIM?
Available evidence suggests that BOLD responses reﬂect both
slow (presynaptic) and fast (somatic) electrophysiological com-
ponents, with a mild bias for the former (Logothetis et al. 2001).
Given this, how should we interpret the stimulus-driven BOLD
decrease in LIM?
It is conceptually attractive to assume that LIM activity results
from a simple, black-box inversion of the size-selective responses
evident invisual cortex.However, localizing thepossible brainme-
chanisms that could accomplish such an inversion is complicated.
One problem is that if such an inversion were computed within
LIM, the presynaptic inputs and the action potentials could poten-
tially drive the BOLD response in opposite directions. For instance,
1) increased ﬁring to larger objects arising in classic visual cortex
would presumably increase BOLD responses in any inhibitory pre-
synaptic terminals on visual-recipient neurons located within
LIM, whereas 2) resultant axon potentials generated within such
LIM neurons could decrease, which could decrease the overall
BOLD response.
This quandary can be avoided by assuming that a signal in-
version is computed at a prior brain site that is physically remote
from (likely posterior to) LIM, within or near classic visual cortex.
By this idea, LIM would reﬂect only the decreased rate of action
potentials arriving in LIM, i.e., the presynaptic components
would have no competing inﬂuence. If conﬁrmed, the size-re-
lated BOLDdecrease in LIM could in fact reﬂect a true suppression
of electrophysiological activity, which occurs at an immediately
prior level.
Another possibility is that the size-inverted response in LIM
arises from a less direct, top-down inﬂuence from frontal or
parietal cortex. That is, input from visual cortex inﬂuences activ-
ity within higher-level association areas (e.g., the frontoparietal
network), thus affecting activity within LIM, via connections
between frontoparietal network and LIM.
Functional Connections of LIM
Experiment 6 suggests that different areas of visual cortex have
different functional connections with anterior and posterior
LIM. Based on the positive (rather than negative) correlation be-
tween the resting state activity ﬂuctuation in anterior LIM and
multiple areas in middle and higher levels of visual cortex, the
reversal of the size function in anterior LIM may reﬂect local
processes within the LIM, rather than a direct suppressive input
from the visual areas (see above).
LIM activity may also be inﬂuenced by input from the main
hubs of DMN (i.e., the PCC andmPFC). This hypothesis is consist-
ent with our functional connection evidence showing that pos-
terior LIM is strongly connected with the DMN main hubs and
dorsolateral frontal cortex (Fig. 6). Thus, the inverted size func-
tion in LIM may reﬂect (at least partly) an input from other
parts of DMN, which in turn is connected with visual cortex. Of
course, the reality might lie somewhere in between, including
parts of 1 or more of the above models. For instance, local
processes and input from other areas could both contribute to
the reversed size function in LIM.
Functional Heterogeneity within LIM
The results of Experiments 1–4 showed a commondependence on
stimulus size, number, and attention throughout LIM. On the
other hand, results of our functional connectivity measurements
(Experiment 6) and our meta-analysis of previous fMRI results
(Fig. 5) suggest that LIM spans different functional subregions.
Speciﬁcally, a posterior portion of LIM shows 1) a strong “posi-
tive” functional connection with the main DMN hubs (i.e., PCC
and mPFC), 2) “negative” functional connection to mid-level vis-
ual areas, and 3) that region overlaps cortical sites in which fMRI
has been related to ToM. Together, these results support the hy-
pothesis that a common neural network is involved in ToM and
DMN. In contrast, amore anterior portion of LIM shows 1) a “posi-
tive” functional connection with mid and high-level visual areas
and 2) overlap with fMRI sites involved in understanding other
people’s facial and body motion.
LIM in Nonhuman Primates?
Previous comparative studies suggest that humans andmonkeys
share a similar organization in classic visual cortex (Van Essen
et al. 2001; Tootell et al. 2003; Orban et al. 2004).Within visual cor-
tex, that mapping similarity is strongest in the occipitotemporal
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areas, becoming progressively weaker in more dorsal and anter-
ior regions.
Here, our data suggest that macaque monkeys do not have a
functional homolog of the human LIM. Despite the use of com-
parable tasks in both species and extensive scans and training,
none of the monkeys showed a reversal of the size function in
the predicted region of cortex, analogous to what was so obvious
in human LIM.
This ﬁnding is consistent with previous comparative studies
of face processing in humans and monkeys, which did not ﬁnd
amacaque homolog for the face-selective patch that has been re-
ported in human STS (see also Tsao et al. 2003; Rajimehr et al.
2009). In humans, that STS face-selective patch is located within
the anterior/ventral portion of LIM (Fig. 5A). Based on a human-
to-monkey map projection, the homolog of this area in monkey
is expected to be located anteriorly (and dorsally) relative to the
monkey MT, within the superior temporal gyrus (i.e., anterior
and dorsal to macaque STS). However, based on moving (rather
than stationary) stimuli, a recent study proposed instead that a
portion of STS fundus was the monkey homolog of this area (Po-
losecki et al. 2013).
Inverted Size Function Elsewhere in Monkey Brain
Although we did not ﬁnd a homolog of LIM in macaque monkeys
in the predicted cortical site, those experiments consistently re-
vealed avery small patch of size-inverted response near themain
(medial STS) face patch inmonkeys. Historically, thatmedial face
patch has been presumed to include the homolog of the human
FFA, based on its functional properties and its location in the cor-
tical map (Tsao et al. 2003; Rajimehr et al. 2009; Nasr et al. 2011).
Conclusion
In human subjects, activity in a part of STC (i.e., LIM) changed in
response to systematic variations in the extent of the stimulated
visual ﬁeld. However, additional lines of evidence suggest
that these apparently externally driven responses can only be in-
terpreted accurately by also considering a strong inﬂuence of
internal, self-related inﬂuences. Speciﬁcally 1) the responses to
variations in visual stimulus extent were inverse in sign, relative
to known responses throughout visual cortex; 2) functional con-
nections showed much stronger links to extra-visual regions, as
opposed to visual cortex.
By deﬁnition, all of LIM showed selectivity to changes in the
extent of visual ﬁeld stimulation. Despite this, LIM could also
be parsed into at least 2 subregions, based on manipulations of
either sensory (face or biological motion) and internal (ToM) fac-
tors. Functional connections in LIM could also be differentiated
into subregions. Thus, overall, human LIM appears to offer an op-
portunity to further study brain processing in sites where intern-
al and external inﬂuences meet and interact. More empirically,
our ﬁndings suggest that future experimentsmight well consider
both these inﬂuences, rather than focusing solely on either in-
ternal or external inﬂuences.
In monkeys, we did not ﬁnd evidence for an LIM homolog, at
least within the expected region of the cortical map, despite
much effort to so. This may indicate that internal, self-reﬂective
processes in the macaques are less prominent than in humans.
On the other hand, self-reﬂective processes in macaques may
well occur in different brain locations, or be evident in different
experiments, comparedwith thosewe found in humans (Mantini
et al. 2011).
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Supplementary material can be found at: http://www.cercor.
oxfordjournals.org/.
Funding
This study was supported by National Institutes of Health (NIH
Grants R01 MH67529 and R01 EY017081) to RBHT, FWO-Vlaande-
ren (FWO Grants G0A5613N and G043912N) and IUAP7-11 and PF
to WV, the Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, the NCRR,
the MIND Institute, and the NIMH Intramural Research Program.
Funding to pay the Open Access publication charges for this art-
icle was provided by NIH Grants R01 EY017081 to RBHT.
Notes
Conﬂict of Interest: None declared.
References
Allison T, Puce A, McCarthy G. 2000. Social perception fromvisual
cues: role of the STS region. Trends Cogn Sci. 4(7):267–278.
Allison T, Puce A, Spencer DD, McCarthy G. 1999. Electrophysio-
logical studies of human face perception. I: Potentials gener-
ated in occipitotemporal cortex by face and non-face stimuli.
Cereb Cortex. 9(5):415–430.
Andrews-Hanna JR, Reidler JS, Sepulcre J, Poulin R, Buckner RL.
2010. Functional-anatomic fractionation of the brain’s default
network. Neuron. 65:550–562.
Anticevic A, Repovs G, Shulman GL, Barch DM. 2010.When less is
more: TPJ and default network deactivation during encoding
predicts working memory performance. Neuroimage. 49(3):
2638–2648.
Arzy S, Molnar-Szakacs I, Blanke O. 2008. Self in time: imagined
self-location inﬂuences neural activity related to mental
time travel. J Neurosci. 28(25):6502–6507.
Ashbridge E, Perrett DI, OramMW, Jellema T. 2000. Effect of image
orientation and size on object recognition: Responses of sin-
gle units in the macaque monkey temporal cortex. Cogn
Neuropsychol. 17(13):13–34.
Avidan G, Tanzer M, Hadj-Bouziane F, Liu N, Ungerleider LG,
Behrmann M. 2014. Selective dissociation between core and
extended regions of the face processing network in congenital
prosopagnosia. Cereb Cortex. 24(6):1565–1578.
Bado P, Engel A, Oliveira‐Souza R, Bramati IE, Paiva FF, Basilio R,
Sato JR, Tovar-Moll F, Moll J. 2013. Functional dissociation of
ventral frontal and dorsomedial default mode network com-
ponents during resting state and emotional autobiographical
recall. Hum Brain Mapp. 35(7):3302–3313.
BeauchampMS, Lee KE, Haxby JV, Martin A. 2003. fMRI responses
to video and point-light displays of moving humans and ma-
nipulable objects. J Cogn Neurosci. 15:991–1001.
Bell AH, Malecek NJ, Morin EL, Hadj-Bouziane F, Tootell RBH,
Ungerleider LG. 2011. Relationship between functional mag-
netic resonance imaging-identiﬁed regions and neuronal cat-
egory selectivity. J Neurosci. 31(34):12229–12240.
Bidet-Caulet A, Voisin J, BertrandO, Fonlupt P. 2005. Listening to a
walking humanactivates the temporal biologicalmotion area.
NeuroImage. 28:132–139.
Buckner RL, Andrews-Hanna JR, Schacter DL. 2008. The brain’s
default network: anatomy, function, and relevance to disease.
Ann N Y Acad Sci. 1124:1–38.
4024 | Cerebral Cortex, 2015, Vol. 25, No. 10
Cabeza R, Nyberg L. 2000. Neural bases of learning and memory:
functional neuroimaging evidence. Curr Opin Neurol. 13
(4):415–421.
Calvert GA, Campbell R. 2003. Reading speech from still and
moving faces: the neural substrates of visible speech. J Cogn
Neurosci. 15:57–70.
Carrasco M, Chang I. 1995. The interaction of objective and sub-
jective organizations in a localization search task. Percept
Psychophys. 57(8):1134–1150.
Carter EJ, Pelphrey KA. 2006. School-aged children exhibit domain-
speciﬁc responses to biological motion. Social Neurosci.
1:396–411.
Chadick JZ, Gazzaley A. 2011. Differential coupling of visual cor-
tex with default or frontal-parietal network based on goals.
Nat Neurosci. 14(7):830–832.
Corbetta M, Kincade JM, Ollinger JM, McAvoy MP, Shulman GL.
2000. Voluntary orienting is dissociated from target detection
in human posterior parietal cortex. Nature Neurosci. 3:
292–297.
Costantini M, Galati G, Ferretti A, Caulo M, Tartaro A, Romani GL,
Aglioti SM. 2005. Neural systems underlying observation
of humanly impossible movements: an fMRI study. Cereb
Cortex. 15:1761–1767.
D’Argembeau A, Collette F, Van der Linden M, Laureys S, Del
Fiore G, Degueldre C, Luxen A, Salmon E. 2005. Self-referential
reﬂective activity and its relationship with rest: a PET study.
Neuroimage. 25(2):616–624.
D’Argembeau A, Stawarczyk D, Majerus S, Collette F, Van der
Linden M, Salmon E. 2010. Modulation of medial prefron-
tal and inferior parietal cortices when thinking about
past, present, and future selves. Social Neurosci. 5(2):
187–200.
David N, Aumann C, Santos NS, Bewernick BH, Eickhoff SB,
Newen A, Shah NJ, Fink GR, Vogeley K. 2008. Differential in-
volvement of the posterior temporal cortex in mentalizing
but not perspective taking. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 3:
279–289.
Denny BT, KoberH,Wager TD, Ochsner KN. 2012. Ameta-analysis
of functional neuroimaging studies of self-and other judg-
ments reveals a spatial gradient for mentalizing in medial
prefrontal cortex. J Cogn Neurosci. 24(8):1742–1752.
Dilks DD, Julian JB, Paunov AM, Kanwisher N. 2013. The occipital
place area is causally and selectively involved in scene per-
ception. J Neurosci. 33(4):1331–1336.
Dodell-Feder D, Koster-Hale J, Bedny M, Saxe R. 2011. fMRI item
analysis in a theory of mind task. Neuroimage. 55(2):705–712.
DubeauMC, IacoboniM, Koski LM,Markovac J, Mazziotta JC. 2001.
Topography for body parts motion in the STS region. Social
Neuroscience Abstracts. 27.
Engell AD, Haxby JV. 2007. Facial expression and gaze-direction in
human superior temporal sulcus. Neuropsychologia. 45(14):
3234–3241.
Epstein RA, Kanwisher N. 1998. A cortical representation of the
local visual environment. Nature. 392:598–601.
Ethofer T, Gschwind M, Vuilleumier P. 2011. Processing social as-
pects of human gaze: a combined fMRI-DTI study. Neuroimage.
55(1):411–419.
Fischl B. 2012. FreeSurfer. Neuroimage. 62(2):774–781.
Fischl B, Sereno MI, Dale AM. 1999. Cortical surface–based ana-
lysis II: inﬂation, flattening, and a surface–based coordinate
system. NeuroImage. 9(2):195–207.
Fox CJ, Iaria G, Barton JJ. 2009. Deﬁning the face processing net-
work: optimization of the functional localizer in fMRI. Hum
Brain Mapp. 30(5):1637–1651.
Friston KJ, Holmes AP, Price CJ, Buchel C, Worsley KJ. 1999. Multi
subject fMRI studies and conjunction analyses. Neuroimage.
10(4):385–396.
Furl N, Garrido L, Dolan RJ, Driver J, Duchaine B. 2011.
Fusiform gyrus face selectivity relates to individual differ-
ences in facial recognition ability. J Cogn Neurosci. 23(7):
1723–1740.
Gallagher HL, Frith CD. 2003. Functional imaging of ‘theory of
mind’. Trends Cogn Sci. 7(2):77–83.
Gallagher HL, Happé F, Brunswick N, Fletcher PC, Frith U,
Frith CD. 2000. Reading the mind in cartoons and stories: an
fMRI study of theory of mind in verbal and nonverbal tasks.
Neuropsychologia. 38:1–21.
Gazzola V, Aziz-Zadeh L, Keysers C. 2006. Empathy and the soma-
totopic auditory mirror system in humans. Curr Biol. 16:
1824–1829.
Gazzola V, Rizzolatti G, Wicker B, Keysers C. 2007. The anthropo-
morphic brain: the mirror neuron system responds to human
and robotic actions. Neuroimage. 35:1674–1684.
Ghatan PH, Hsieh JC, Wirsen-Meurling A, Wredling R, Eriksson L,
Stone-Elander S, Levander S, Ingvar M. 1995. Brain activation
induced by the perceptual maze test: a PET study of cognitive
performance. Neuroimage. 2(2):112–124.
Gilbert SJ, Dumontheil I, Simons JS, Frith CD, Burgess PW. 2007.
Comment on “Wandering minds: the default network and
stimulus-independent thought”. Science. 317:43.
GobbiniMI, Koralek AC, Bryan RE,MontgomeryKJ, Haxby JV. 2007.
Two takes on the social brain: a comparison of theory of mind
tasks. J Cogn Neurosci. 19:1803–1814.
Greene JD, Nystrom LE, Engell AD, Darley JM, Cohen JD. 2004. The
neural bases of cognitive conﬂict and control in moral judg-
ment. Neuron. 44:389–400.
Greene J, Sommerville RB, Nystrom LE, Darley JM, Cohen JD. 2001.
An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral
judgment. Science. 293:2105–2108.
Greicius MD, Krasnow B, Reiss AL, Menon V. 2003. Functional
connectivity in the resting brain: a network analysis of the
default mode hypothesis. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 100:
253–258.
Greicius MD, Menon V. 2004. Default-mode activity during a pas-
sive sensory task: uncoupled from deactivation but impacting
activation. J Cogn Neurosci. 16:1484–1492.
Grèzes J, Armony JL, Rowe J, Passingham RE. 2003. Activations re-
lated to ‘mirror’ and ‘canonical’ neurons in the human brain:
an fMRI study. NeuroImage. 18:928–937.
Grosbras MH, Paus T. 2006. Brain networks involved in viewing
angry hands and faces. Cereb Cortex. 16:1087–1096.
Grossman ED, Blake R. 2002. Brain areas active during visual per-
ception of biological motion. Neuron. 35:1167–1175.
Grill-Spector K. 2003. The neural basis of object perception. Curr
Opin Neurobiol. 13(2):159–166.
Grill-Spector K, Kourtzi Z, KanwisherN. 2001. The lateral occipital
complex and its role in object recognition. Vision Res. 41(10):
1409–1422.
Gusnard DA, Akbudak E, Shulman GL, Raichle ME. 2001. Medial
prefrontal cortex and self-referential mental activity: relation
to a default mode of brain function. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA.
98:4259:64.
Hagmann P, Cammoun L, Gigandet X, Meuli R, Honey CJ,
Wedeen VJ, Sporns O. 2008. Mapping the structural core of
human cerebral cortex. PLoS Biol. 6:e159.
Hahn B, Ross TJ, Stein EA. 2007. Cingulate activation increases dy-
namicallywith response speed under stimulus unpredictabil-
ity. Cereb Cortex. 17:1664–1671.
Increased Visual Stimulation Decreases pSTS Activity Nasr et al. | 4025
Hamilton AC, Grafton S. 2006. Goal representation in human an-
terior intraparietal sulcus. J Neurosci. 26:1133–1137.
Haxby JV, Hoffman EA, Gobbini MI. 2000. The distributed human
neural system for face perception. Trends Cogn Sci. 4(6):
223–233.
Heatherton TF. 2011. Neuroscience of self and self-regulation.
Ann Rev Psychol. 62:363.
Heekeren HR, Wartenburger I, Schmidt H, Prehn K,
Schwintowski HP, Villringer A. 2005. Inﬂuence of bodily
harm on neural correlates of semantic and moral decision-
making. NeuroImage. 24:887–897.
Heekeren HR, Wartenburger I, Schmidt H, Schwintowski HP,
Villringer A. 2003. An fMRI study of simple ethical decision-
making. Neuroreport. 14(9):1215–1219.
Hinds OP, Rajendran N, Polimeni JR, Augustinack JC, Wiggins G,
Wald LL, Diana Rosas H, Potthast A, Schwartz EL, Fischl B.
2008. Accurate prediction of V1 location from cortical
folds in a surface coordinate system. Neuroimage. 39(4):
1585–1599.
Hooker CI, Paller KA, Gitelman DR, Parrish TB, Mesulam M,
Reber PJ. 2003. Brain networks for analyzing eye gaze. Cogn
Brain Res. 17(2):406–418.
Hynes CA, Baird AA, Grafton ST. 2006. Differential role of the or-
bitofrontal lobe in emotional versus cognitive perspective-
taking. Neuropsychologia. 44:374–383.
Ishai A, Schmidt CF, Boesiger P. 2005. Face perception ismediated
by a distributed cortical network. Brain Res Bull. 67(1):87–93.
ItoM, TamuraH, Fujita I, Tanaka K. 1995. Size and Position Invari-
ance of Neuronal Responses in Monkey Inferoterotemporal
Cortex. J Neurophysiol. 73:218–226.
Jastorff J, Orban GA. 2009. Human functional magnetic resonance
imaging reveals separation and integration of shape and mo-
tion cues in biological motion processing. J Neurosci. 29
(22):7315–7329.
Johansson G. 1973. Visual perception of biological motion and a
model for its analysis. Percept Psychophys. 14(2):201–211.
Johnson-Frey SH, Newman-Nordlund R, Grafton ST. 2005. A dis-
tributed left hemisphere network active during planning of
everyday tool. Cereb Cortex. 6:681–695.
Jolicoeur P. 1987. A size-congruency effect in memory for visual
shape. Mem Cogn. 15(6):531–543.
Julian JB, Fedorenko E, Webster J, Kanwisher N. 2012. An
algorithmic method for functionally deﬁning regions of
interest in the ventral visual pathway. Neuroimage. 60(4):
2357–2364.
Kanwisher N. 2010. Functional speciﬁcity in the human brain: a
window into the functional architecture of the mind. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA. 107(25):11163–11170.
Kanwisher N,McDermott J, ChunM. 1997. The fusiform face area:
amodule in human extrastriate cortex specialized for the per-
ception of faces. J Neurosci. 17:4302–4311.
Kobayashi C, Glover GH, Temple E. 2007. Children’s and adults’
neural bases of verbal and nonverbal ‘theory of mind’.
Neuropsychologia. 45:1522–1532.
Kojima T, Onoe H, Hikosaka K, Tsutsui KI, Tsukada H,
Watanabe M. 2009. Default mode of brain activity demon-
strated by positron emission tomography imaging in awake
monkeys: higher rest-related than working memory-related
activity inmedial cortical areas. J Neurosci. 29(46):14463–14471.
Konkle T, Oliva A. 2012. A real-world size organization of object
responses in occipito-temporal cortex. Neuron. 74:1114–1124.
Leslie AM, Friedman O, German TP. 2004. Core mechanisms in
‘theory of mind. Trends Cogn Sci. 8:528–533.
Liu J, Harris A, Kanwisher N. 2010. Perception of face parts and
face conﬁgurations: an fMRI study. J Cogn Neurosci. 22
(1):203–211.
Logothetis NK, Pauls J, Augath M, Trinath T, Oeltermann A. 2001.
Neurophysiological investigation of the basis of the fMRI sig-
nal. Nature. 412(6843):150–157.
Makuuchi M. 2005. Is Broca’s area crucial for imitation? Cereb
Cortex. 15:563–570.
MalachR, Reppas JB, BensonRR, KwongKK, JiangH, KennedyWA,
Ledden PJ, Brady TJ, Tootell RBH. 1995. Object-related activity
revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging in
human occipital cortex. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 92(18):
8135–8139.
Mantini D, Gerits A, Nelissen K, Durand JB, Joly O, Simone L,
SawamuraH,Wardak C, OrbanGA, Buckner RL, et al. 2011. De-
fault mode of brain function in monkeys. J Neurosci. 31
(36):12954–12962.
Mantini D, Vanduffel W. 2013. Emerging roles of the brain’s de-
fault network. Neuroscientist. 19(1):76–87.
Mars RB, Sallet J, Neubert FX, Rushworth MF. 2013. Connectivity
proﬁles reveal the relationship between brain areas for social
cognition in human andmonkey temporoparietal cortex. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA. 110(26):10806–10811.
Mason MF, Norton MI, Van Horn JD, Wegner DM, Grafton ST,
Macrae CN. 2007. Wandering minds: the default network
and stimulus-independent thought. Science. 315:393–395.
Mazoyer B, Zago L, Mellet E, Bricogne S, Etard O, Houde O,
Crivello F, Joliot M, Petit L, Tzourio-Mazoyer N. 2001. Cortical
networks for working memory and executive functions sus-
tain the conscious resting state in man. Brain Res Bull. 54
(3):287–298.
McKiernan KA, D’Angelo BR, Kaufman JN, Binder JR. 2006. Inter-
rupting the “stream of consciousness”: an fMRI investigation.
Neuroimage. 29:1185–1191.
Mitchell JP. 2008. Activity in right temporo-parietal junction is not
selective for theory of mind. Cereb Cortex. 18:262–271.
Mitchell JP, Macrae CN, Banaji MR. 2006. Dissociable medial pre-
frontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar
others. Neuron. 50:655–663.
Moll J, de Oliveira-Souza R, Bramati IE, Grafman J. 2002. Function-
al networks in emotional moral and nonmoral social judg-
ments. NeuroImage. 16:696–703.
Molnar-Szakacs I, Uddin LQ. 2013. Self-processing and the default
mode network: interactions with the mirror neuron system.
Front Hum Neurosci. 7:571.
Morris JP, Pelphrey KA, McCarthy G. 2005. Regional brain activa-
tion evoked when approaching a virtual human on a virtual
walk. J Cogn Neurosci. 17:1744–1752.
Nasr S, Devaney KJ, Tootell RBH. 2013. Spatial encoding and
underlying circuitry in scene-selective cortex. Neuroimage.
83:892–900.
Nasr S, Liu N, Devaney KJ, Yue X, Rajimehr R, Ungerleider LG,
Tootell RBH. 2011. Scene-selective cortical regions in human
and non-human primates. J Neurosci. 31(39):13771–13785.
Nasr S, Tootell RBH. 2012. Role of fusiform and anterior temporal
cortical areas in facial recognition. Neuroimage. 63(3):
1743–1753.
Nelissen K, Vanduffel W, Orban GA. 2006. Charting the lower su-
perior temporal region, a new motion-sensitive region in
monkey superior temporal sulcus. J Neurosci. 26(22):
5929–5947.
Northoff G, Heinzel A, de Greck M, Bermpohl F, Dobrowolny H,
Panksepp J. 2006. Self-referential processing in our brain - a
4026 | Cerebral Cortex, 2015, Vol. 25, No. 10
meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. Neuroimage. 31
(1):440–457.
Ochsner K, Knierim K, Ludlow D, Hanelin J, Ramachandran T,
Glover G, Mackey S. 2004. Reﬂecting upon feelings: an fMRI
study of neural systems supporting the attribution of emotion
to self and other. J Cogn Neurosci. 16(10):1746–1772.
Ohnishi T, Moriguchi Y, Matsuda H, Mori T, Hirakata M,
Imabayashi E, Hirao K, Nemoto K, Kaga M, Inagaki M, et al.
2004. The neural network for the mirror system and mentali-
zing in normally developed children: an fMRI study.
NeuroReport. 15:1483–1487.
Op De Beeck H, Vogels R. 2000. Spatial sensitivity of macaque in-
ferior temporal neurons. J Compar Neurol. 426(4):505–518.
Orban GA, Van Essen D, Vanduffel W. 2004. Comparative map-
ping of higher visual areas in monkeys and humans. Trends
Cogn Sci. 8:315–324.
PeelenMV,Wiggett AJ, Downing PE. 2006. Patterns of fMRI activity
dissociate overlapping functional brain areas that respond to
biological motion. Neuron. 49:815–822.
Pelphrey KA, Morris JP, Michelich CR, Allison T, McCarthy G. 2005.
Functional anatomy of biological motion perception in pos-
terior temporal cortex: an fMRI study of eye, mouth and
hand movements. Cereb Cortex. 15:1866–1876.
Perner J, Aichhorn M, Kronbichler M, Staffen W, Ladurner G.
2006. Thinking of mental and other representations: the
roles of left and right temporo-parietal junction. J Neurosci.
1:245–258.
Peuskens H, Vanrie J, Verfaillie K, Orban GA. 2005. Speciﬁcity of
regions processing biological motion. Eur J Neurosci. 21:
2864–2875.
Pfeifer J, Lieberman M, Dapretto M. 2007. “I know you are but
what am I?!”: neural bases of self-and social knowledge
retrieval in children and adults. J Cogn Neurosci. 19(8):
1323–1337.
Pierno AC, Becchio C,Wall MB, Smith AT, Castiello U. 2006. Trans-
fer of interfered motor patterns to self from others. Eur J
Neurosci. 23:1949–1955.
Pinsk MA, Arcaro M, Weiner KS, Kalkus JF, Inati SJ, Gross CG,
Kastner S. 2009. Neural representations of faces and body
parts in macaque and human cortex: a comparative FMRI
study. J Neurophysiol. 101(5):2581–2600.
Prehn K, Wartenburger I, Mériau K, Scheibe C, Goodenough OR,
Villringer A, van der Meer E, Heekeren HR. 2008. Individual
differences in moral judgment competence inﬂuence neural
correlates of socio-normative judgments. Soc Cogn Affect
Neurosci. 3:33–46.
Polosecki P, Moeller S, Schweers N, Romanski LM, Tsao DY,
Freiwald WA. 2013. Faces in motion: selectivity of macaque
and human face processing areas for dynamic stimuli.
J Neurosci. 33(29):11768–11773.
Popivanov ID, Jastorff J, Vanduffel W, Vogels R. 2012. Stimulus
representations in body-selective regions of the macaque
cortex assessed with event-related fMRI. NeuroImage. 63(2):
723–741.
PuceA, Allison T, AsgariM, Gore JC,McCarthyG. 1996. Differential
sensitivity of human visual cortex to faces, letterstrings, and
textures: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study.
J Neurosci. 16(16):5205–5215.
Puce A, Allison T, Bentin S, Gore JC, McCarthy G. 1998. Temporal
cortex activation in humans viewing eye and mouth move-
ments. J Neurosci. 18(6):2188–2199.
Qin P, Northoff G. 2011. How is our self related to midline
regions and the default-mode network? Neuroimage. 57
(3):1221–1233.
Raichle ME, MacLeod AM, Snyder AZ, Powers WJ, Gusnard DA,
Shulman GL. 2001. A default mode of brain function. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA. 98:676–682.
Rajimehr R, Young JC, Tootell RBH. 2009. An anterior temporal
face patch in human cortex, predicted by macaque maps.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 106(6):1995–2000.
Ramnani N, Miall RC. 2004. A system in the human brain for pre-
dicting the actions of others. Nat Neurosci. 7:85–90.
Rilling JK, Barks SK, Parr LA, Preuss TM, Faber TL, Pagnoni G,
Brmner JD, Votaw JR. 2007. A comparison of resting-state
brain activity in humans and chimpanzees. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA. 104(43):17146–17151.
Robertson D, Snarey J, Ousley O, Keith-Harenski K, Bowmand FD,
Gilkey R, Kilts C. 2007. The neural processing ofmoral sensitiv-
ity to issues of justice and care. Neuropsychologia. 45:755–766.
Said CP, Haxby JV, Todorov A. 2011. Brain systems for assessing
the affective value of faces. Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci. 366
(1571):1660–1670.
SakreidaK, Schubotz RI,Wolfensteller U, CramonDY. 2005.Motion
clasdependency in observer’motor areas revealed by function-
al magnetic resonance imaging. J Neurosci. 25:1335–1342.
Santi A, Servos P, Vatikiotis-Bateson E, Kuratate T, Munhall K.
2003. Perceiving biological motion: dissociating visible speech
from walking. J Cogn Neurosci. 15:800–809.
Saxe R, Kanwisher N. 2003. People thinking about people - the
role of the temporo-parietal junction in theory of mind.
NeuroImage. 19:1835–1842.
Saxe R, Powell L. 2006. It’s the thought that counts: speciﬁc brain
regions for one component of theory of mind. Psychol Sci. 17
(8):692–699.
Saxe R, Xiao DK, Kovacsc G, Perrett DI, Kanwisher N. 2004. A region
of right posterior superior temporal sulcus responds to
observed intentional actions. Neuropsychologia. 42:1435–1446.
Saygin AP, Wilson SM, Hagler DJ, Bates E, Sereno MI. 2004. Point-
light biological motion perception activates human premotor
cortex. J Neurosci. 24(27):6181–6188.
Schacter DL, Addis DR. 2007. The cognitive neuroscience
of constructive memory: remembering the past and ima-
gining the future. Philos Trans R Soc B Biol Sci. 362(1481):
773–786.
Schnell K, Heekeren K, Schnitker R, Daumann J, Weber J,
Heszelmann V, Moller-Hartmann W, Thron A, Gouzoulis-
Mayfrank E. 2007. An fMRI approach to particularize the fron-
toparietal network for visuomotor action monitoring: detec-
tion of incongruence between test subjects’ actions and
resulting perceptions. NeuroImage. 34:332–341.
Schubotz RI, von Cramon DY. 2004. Sequences of abstract non-
biological stimuli share ventral premotor cortex with action
observation and imagery. J Neurosci. 24:5467–5474.
Schultz J, Brockhaus M, Bülthoff HH, Pilz KS. 2013. What the
human brain likes about facial motion. Cerebral Cortex. 23
(5):1167–1178.
Sebastian CL, Fontaine NM, Bird G, Blakemore SJ, De Brito SA,
McCrory EJ, Viding E. 2011. Neural processing associated
with cognitive and affective Theory of Mind in adolescents
and adults. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. doi:10.1093/scan/
nsr023.
SerenoMI, Tootell RBH. 2005. Frommonkeys to humans: what do
we now know about brain homologies? Curr Opin Neurobiol.
15:135–144.
Shulman GL, Astaﬁev SV, McAvoy MP, d’Avossa G, Corbetta M.
2007. Right TPJ deactivation during visual search: functional
signiﬁcance and support for a ﬁlter hypothesis. Cereb
Cortex. 17(11):2625–2633.
Increased Visual Stimulation Decreases pSTS Activity Nasr et al. | 4027
Shulman GL, Fiez JA, Corbetta M, Buckner RL, Miezin FM,
Raichle ME, Petersen SE. 1997. Common blood ﬂow changes
across visual tasks. 2. Decreases in cerebral cortex. J Cogn
Neurosci. 9:648–663.
Sommer M, Döhnel K, Sodian B, Meinhardt J, Thoermer C,
Hajak G. 2007. Neural correlates of true and false belief rea-
soning. NeuroImage. 35:1378–1384.
Spreng RN, Grady CL. 2010. Patterns of brain activity supporting
autobiographical memory, prospection, and theory of mind,
and their relationship to the default mode network. J Cogn
Neurosci. 22(6):1112–1123.
Spreng RN, Mar RA, Kim AS. 2009. The common neural basis of
autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, theory
of mind, and the default mode: a quantitative meta-analysis.
J Cogn Neurosci. 21(3):489–510.
Svoboda E, McKinnon MC, Levine B. 2006. The functional neuro-
anatomy of autobiographical memory: a meta-analysis.
Neuropsychologia. 44:2189–2208.
Thompson JC, Hardee JE, Panayiotou A, Crewther D, Puce A. 2007.
Common and distinct brain activation to viewing dynamic
sequences of face and hand movements. Neuroimage. 37
(3):966–973.
Tootell RBH, Hadjikhani N, Hall EK, Marrett S, Vanduffel W,
Vaughan JT, Dale AM. 1998. The retinotopy of visual spatial at-
tention. Neuron. 21(6):1409–1422.
Tootell RBH, Tsao D, VanduffelW. 2003. Neuroimaging weighs in:
humans meet macaques in “primate” visual cortex. J
Neurosci. 23(10):3981–3989.
Tsao DY, Freiwald WA, Knutsen TA, Mandeville JB, Tootell RBH.
2003. The representation of faces and objects in Macaque
Cerebral Cortex. Nat Neurosci. 6:989–995.
Vaina LM, Solomon J, Chowdhury S, Sinha P, Belliveau JW. 2001.
Functional neuroanatomy of biological motion perception in
humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 98:11656–11661.
van der Meer L, Costafreda S, Aleman A, David AS. 2010. Self-re-
ﬂection and the brain: a theoretical review andmeta-analysis
of neuroimaging studies with implications for schizophrenia.
Neurosci Biobehav Rev. 34(6):935–946.
Villarreal M, Fridman EA, Amengual A, Falasco G, Gerscovich ER,
Ulloa ER, Leiguarda RC. 2008. The neural substrate of gesture
recognition. Neuropsychologia. 46:2371–2382.
Vanduffel W, Fize D, Mandeville JB, Nelissen K, Hecke PV,
Tootell RBH, Orban GA. 2001. Visual motion processing
investigated using contrast agent-enhanced fMRI in awake
behaving monkeys. Neuron. 32(4):565–577.
Van Essen DC. 2005. A population-average, landmark- and surface-
based (PALS) atlas of human cerebral cortex. Neuroimage.
28:635–662.
Van Essen DC, Lewis JW, Drury HA, Hadjikhani N, Tootell RBH,
Bakircioglu M, Miller MI. 2001. Mapping visual cortex in mon-
keys and humans using surface-based atlases. Vision Res.
41:1359–1378.
Van Overwalle F, Baetens K. 2009. Understanding others’ actions
and goals by mirror and mentalizing systems: a meta-ana-
lysis. Neuroimage. 48(3):564–584.
Vincent JL, Patel GH, Fox MD, Snyder AZ, Baker JT, Van Essen DC,
Zempel JM, Snyder LH, Corbetta M, Raichle ME. 2007. Intrinsic
functional architecture in the anaesthetized monkey brain.
Nature. 447(7140):83–86.
Wheaton KJ, Thompson JC, Syngeniotis A, Abbott DF, Puce A.
2004. Viewing the motion of human body parts activates dif-
ferent regions of premotor, temporal, and parietal cortex.
NeuroImage. 22:277–288.
Wicker B, Ruby P, Royet JP, Fonlupt P. 2003. A relation between rest
and the self in the brain? Brain Res Rev. 43(2):224–230.
Winston JS, Henson RNA, Fine-GouldenMR, Dolan RJ. 2004. fMRI-
adaptation reveals dissociable neural representations of
identity and expression in face perception. J Neurophysio.
92(3):1830–1839.
Wolfe JM, O’Neill P, Bennett SC. 1998. Why are there eccentricity
effects in visual search? Visual and attentional hypotheses.
Percept Psychophys. 60(1):140–156.
Yeo BT, Krienen FM, Sepulcre J, Sabuncu MR, Lashkari D,
Hollinshead M, Roffman JL, Smoller JW, Zollei L, Polimeni JR,
et al. 2011. The organization of the human cerebral cortex es-
timated by intrinsic functional connectivity. J Neurophysiol.
106(3):1125–1165.
Young L, Cushman F, Hauser M, Saxe R. 2007. The neural basis of
the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 104:8235–8240.
Young L, Dodell-Feder D, Saxe R. 2010. What gets the attention
of the temporo-parietal junction? An fMRI investigation of
attention and theory of mind. Neuropsychologia. 48(9):
2658–2664.
Young L, Saxe R. 2008. The neural basis of belief encoding and
integration in moral judgment. NeuroImage. 40:1912–1920.
4028 | Cerebral Cortex, 2015, Vol. 25, No. 10
